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CHINA’S “ONE BELT, ONE ROAD” INITIATIVE: 
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES1
One of the most important lessons that European Union shows us is that from the very 
beginning of the European integration process, in the sixties and seventies of the last 
century, transport policy played a key role in creating the common and shared agreed 
rules of the internal market and in bringing closer European countries and citizens.
This policy contributed not only to reducing the “economic gap” facilitating the 
implementation of the four freedoms of movement, but also promoting people-to-peo-
ple contacts and finally the process of reconciliation in Europe. With the ambitious 
One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), China would like to fully project its power 
ideology and political influence in Asia. After an enormous redistribution of economic 
power among the world’s main powers in the last twenty five years (Menon, 2015: 3), 
in late 2013 President Xi Jinpin announced a grand Chinese development strategy, the 
One Belt, One Road Initiative to be pursued in the coming three or four decades.
The purpose of the present article is to analyze some of the more ambiguous tools 
of this new ambitious Strategic Concept of Beijing’s Foreign Policy. Besides, it will 
address some other political, operational and technical issues to be solved to meet the 
high expectations created by this Chinese Initiative involving 65 countries in three 
continents in varying degrees. Obviously the perception and challenges involved are 
distinct for each country and stakeholder.
This study will focus on the political, economic and trade objectives of this Initia-
tive which also define the main features of today Chinese geopolitical strategy. As to 
requirements for the successful achievement of the OBOR Initiative, it will be subject 
of a separate publication.
THE EU POSITION
Since the launching of OBOR Initiative, the European Union Institutions have been 
rather cautious. Actually, the European Union and its Member States have not yet 
adopted a common position on this ambitious and ambiguous Chinese initiative.
On 22n June 2016, the European Commission and the High representative of the 
Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy published a joint communication pro-
posing new elements for updating EU strategy on China. On the Chinese OBOR Initia-
tive the Joint Communication underlines that “Co-operation with on its ‘One Belt, One 
1 This article expresses personal views of the author. It is a part of wider analysis elaborated dur-
ing Fellowship offered by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to academic visiting scholars.
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Road’ initiative should be dependent China fulfilling of its declared aim of making it 
an open platform which adheres to market rules and international norms in order to 
deliver benefits for all and to encourage responsible economic behavior in third coun-
tries” (European Commission, 2016: 10).
In the context of ongoing negotiations on an ambitious EU-China Investment 
Agreement, the European Commission seems ready to create synergies between the 
OBOR Initiative and the EU Investment Plans, notably the Strategic Investment Fund. 
In this regard, an agreement was signed in September 2015 to launch a Connectivity 
Platform promoting links with the EU maritime and road transport network plans and 
to identify possible synergies between the Infrastructure Strategic Fund (the so-called 
Juncker Plan) and the financial instruments of the OBOR Initiative (the new Chinese-
led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund). A working group 
European Commission-China has been set up to define the concrete modalities of Chi-
nese participation in the Juncker Plan. In any event, it is important that China adapts to 
all the European rules concerning Trans-European Transport Network policy.
Actually there are still many open questions regarding the OBOR Initiative and 
not only for the EU institutions. In a biannual Conference organized by the Taiwanese 
think-tank Institute for International Relations of Chegchi University in December 
2015, most of the scholars underlined the high degree of uncertainty concerning key 
issue related with the content, functioning and implementation of the Initiative. For 
instance, the main document entitles Vision and Actions on jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Road (Ministry of Commerce of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 2015) avoids dealing with the institutional governance of the 
Initiative, the decision-making process and the functioning of its instruments. This 
uncertainty could explain the cautiousness and slow path of the ongoing negotiations 
with the European Commission on concrete modalities of cooperation on concrete 
investment projects.
Conversely, following an active and effective public diplomacy of Beijing authori-
ties, 16 Eastern European Countries (the so-called “16+1” format) have met several 
times at high ranking official level showing their willingness and strong interest to par-
ticipate in this initiative through cargo train connections and cargo fast lanes between 
Europe and China (Suokas, 2015).
THE CONTENT OF THE INITIATIVE: GEOPOLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC AND TRADE OBJECTIVES
After describing the initial reaction of the European Union to the launching of the Chi-
nese OBOR Initiative, it could be appropriate to analyze its likely aims and to test the 
real intentions of the leadership of the People’s Republic of China. Is China looking 
for a new “Common Destiny” with its neighboring countries or a fight for Asian and 
world hegemony?
Is the OBOR Initiative a common win-win endeavor of 65 countries in order to 
give a new impetus and reinvigorate the current stagnant phase of globalization, or is 
it a Beijing domestic policy to fight to avoid the development trap?
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It seems evident that the final objective of Chinese authorities in launching the 
OBOR Strategy is to see China become in two or three decades the world’s strongest 
economic superpower. Even though this statement is always carefully avoided by the 
Chinese leadership and officials, the exhaustive analyses of what we could call the 
“geography of the OBOR Strategy” shows the consistency of this hidden ambitious 
national objective.
Currently, besides some priority Asian and European road and railway corridors to 
bypass potential maritime blockades (i.e. Malacca Strait) or increasing the cost com-
petitiveness of Chinese products, the network of civil and military harbor facilities 
under construction overseas already includes the five continents (Asia, Oceania, Af-
rica, Europe and America) and all the oceans currently transitable in order to extend its 
maritime trade flows and geopolitical influence. During the current decade, coinciding 
with the political mandate of President Xi Jinping, the main purpose of the current 
Chinese leadership is to focus on the previous intermediate objectives and, according 
to my findings, these intermediate objectives of OBOR Strategy are six fold.
A) The Projection of power ideology and new military ambitions in Asia
This objective is the most important at international level and follows the huge shift 
in the redistribution of economic power amongst the word’s powerful countries in the 
last decades. Beijing wants to show openly its power ideology in Asia. In other words, 
mainland China would like to fully project in Asia its ideology, image and political 
influence.
Furthermore, China has new military ambitions: to protect its maritime space by 
forcing out the United States, and projecting its naval power in other oceans, returning 
to the ocean after Zhen He’s voyages during the Ming dynasty. The China’s foreign 
and security policies have become more assertive and will probably never give up its 
core interest, especially in the South and East Chinese Seas (Friedberg, 2016).
As analyzed bellow, this new assertiveness is not without contradictions and has 
been noted by European sources (European Parliament, 2013). If recent tensions esca-
late; the maritime territorial disputes have the potential to undermine peace and pros-
perity in the region and finally the successful outcome of the whole OBOR Initiative. 
In this context it is useful to remember that the European Union is not taking sides on 
territorial disputes but has a strong interest in preserving freedom of navigation on 
some of the world’s busiest sea lanes and obviously in peaceful and stable maritime 
regions.
B) Countering overdependence and influence of other regional actors:  
Russian and Indian rivalries
In geopolitical terms, the OBOR Strategy is also defined to counter the Russian influ-
ence in Central and Western Asia. With the Initiative, Beijing is seeking to limit over-
dependence on Russia energy and trades routes to Europe.
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It goes without saying that OBOR will certainly increase political, economic and 
trade rivalry with the Eurasian Economic Community President Putin-led Initiative. 
At this stage it is unclear how Beijing will bypass the political and technical obstacles 
to connect Asia and Europe through the central Asian land bridge. However President 
Xi Jiping is developing a very active diplomacy to seduce the public opinion of these 
strategic countries2 (Yu-Wen Chen, 2015).
Once again the OBOR Initiative raises another paradox: Russia is China’s predomi-
nant supplier of arms, a trend that will continue as long as Beijing continues to need 
help in modernizing its armed forces and upgrading its domestic industrial military 
capabilities (Oxford Analytica, 2015).
C) Competing for Economic and Trade hegemony in Asia:  
OBOR Mega trade block as an alternative and competitor  
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Mega deal?
There is no doubt that through the OBOR Initiative, Beijing is trying to establish an 
alternative Mega trade block to act as a competitor to the TTP lead by USA. If the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was designed to isolate China-USA and Japanese 
politicians advocate that Beijing is not ready to apply and respect common rules on 
competition, transparency, e-commerce, Intellectual Property Rights, public procure-
ment sand labor standards – then Beijing argues that its Mega-trade proposal is inclu-
sive and thus open to all economic and trading partners, independent of their degree 
of development.
Actually one relevant question in this context is how to ensure coherence and com-
patibility between the TTP Agreement and the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership) – the Free trade agreement in negotiation between the ten member 
States of ASEAN and the six States with which ASEAN has existing free trade agree-
ments (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand) and due to be 
concluded at the final of 2016.
How to avoid overlapping and contradictory trade rules for the countries participat-
ing in both Mega trade deals? Could it be possible to create a harmonized set of rules 
of origin amongst TTP and RCEP Members? These are crucial issues to be dealt with 
in the near future.
Another relevant and complex question is how to harmonize the future RCEP 
Agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (with some of its mem-
ber States who have not yet joined the World Trade Organization) in the frame-
work of the implementation of the OBOR Initiative with Central Asian countries’ 
partners. The EU has already refused to negotiate with the EEU pointing out this 
inconsistency).
A key question for our world trade common rules system is: could it be possible to 
multilateralise the achievements of these big regional Mega trade deals?
2 Recent academic pilot tests show appositive attitude in Kazakhstan about the rise and influence 
of China.
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D) Domestic Priority objective: Economic development and political stability 
of PRC’s Western Regions
One objective of paramount importance for the Chinese leadership is of domestic na-
ture: to develop and thereby stabilize China’s western regions by integrating them 
into international trade routes and by developing Central Asian markets for Chinese 
goods.
Actually, the launching of the OBOR Initiative coincides with huge overcapac-
ities in some basic industrial sectors (cement, steel, shipping, rolling stock, solar pan-
els…) and the impressive amount of foreign exchange reserves (more than 2,5 trillion 
dollars)3 (EU Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016).
As China’s macroeconomic performance has been slowing down in the last two 
years from three decades of double–digit growth, the launching of the OBOR Initiative 
is also an intensive and fully-fledged propaganda campaign domestically oriented to 
improve the image of the top political new leadership in a period of increasing social 
unrest and environmental consciousness-raising. Thus, serious political marketing in 
the media-in 2014 saw more than one million articles published in China on the OBOR 
Initiative – to regain the trust of population in the capacity of its leadership to provide 
sufficient economic growth, employment and increasing social progress to the whole 
country and not only the most favored coastland regions. Obviously, this propaganda 
campaign was presented as a huge consultation to mobilize the population, encourage 
the debate and get ideas and proposals on how better to implement this new great and 
ambitious leap forward for China.
Furthermore, the Chinese leadership is very concerned about separatist movements 
in Xinjiang, as well as the fear that Afghan terrorism and Islamic extremism may cross 
the border and spread into this region (Ming-yen Tsai, 2014).
By proposing to reinforce cooperation in combating the three evil forces: separa-
tism, extremism, and terrorism – through the multilateral role played by the multi-
lateral platform of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Measures in Asia 
(CICA), China is looking to ensure political and social stability in the PRC’s Western 
Regions and protect the implementation of One Belt, One Road investments projects 
from being threatened from potential terrorist attacks.
Both aspects, economic regional development and the political stability of the 
Western regions and Greater China are intrinsically linked, and are defining features of 
the OBOR Strategic Concept.
a) Solve overcapacity in basic industrial sectors  
and mobilize foreign exchanges reserves
For many business stakeholders and scholars in Taiwan, the mainland China Initiative 
is seen as an opportunity to export overcapacities abroad and to mobilize its foreign 
exchange reserves by investing abroad and offer loans to developing countries, which 
would then contract Chinese firms for major infrastructure and construction projects, 
3 It concludes that the Chinese central government efforts to address the problem since 2009 
have been ineffectual).
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especially to secure access to new sources of energy (the permanent obsession of the 
Chinese leadership) as well as raw materials and foodstuff. It would also facilitate 
Chinese goods entering new markets (i.e. the faraonic and problematic new Nicaragua 
canal between the Atlantic and Pacific). China still lacks access to export markets 
which explains the dynamism and urgency for extending its network of FTA’s and 
Preferential Agreements with its neighboring Asian countries.
b) The AIIB: a new financial diplomacy tool? Towards an institutional renewal  
of the international financial order?
By creating a new development bank (the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank-AIIB), 
Beijing is not only upgrading its international financial status, but also avoiding over-
dependence on existing international financial institutions.
The positive response to the Chinese initiative (60 states have already accepted 
to join) in particular the participation of the biggest European Union economies, this 
could certainly be considered an important diplomatic success for China despite the 
strong opposition and lobbying by the USA.
Its remains to be seen if this new financial institution can work efficiently keeping 
the highest international standards for investments, and increasing competition with 
other international banks (World Bank, The Asian Development Bank, the BRIC’s De-
velopment Bank). Up to now, its establishment has contributed to an increased rivalry 
and provision of national funds for financing infrastructure projects by other main 
countries in Asia such as Japan and South Korea. The USA scholars fear that this new 
bank could “facilitate the emergence of a more fragmented global finance governance 
and a concomitant increasing number of veto players are likely to make global consen-
sus harder to reach” (Injoo Sohn, 2015).
Anyway, as clearly demonstrated by a thorough analysis of the rules and composi-
tion of the new Chinese-led development bank by Mr Ian Tsung-yen Chen (Ian Tsung-
yen Chen, 2012), Beijing’s objective is not to start an institutional renewal of the inter-
national financial order with new and revolutionary institutional and operational rules 
in bank decision making, but rather to consolidate their leading position in the banking 
sector. With 26.06% of voting share within AIIB, China has a veto power (25% is veto 
threshold) on all financial decisions to be adopted. Conversely, the EU Member States 
which negotiated separately and quickly their accession to the bank (Germany, France, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta) have got a poor political quota, far away 
from their whole GDP ratio and its political power in current International Financial 
Institutions such as the World Bank. For instance, the United Kingdom got a voting 
share of 2.91% (in comparison with 3.95% in the World Bank) representing 6.60% of 
the GDP of all members of AIIB. One could conclude that China succeeded in trans-
ferring its current underrepresentation problem in the World Bank and Asian Develop-
ment Bank to the European Union Member States which decided to join separately the 
AIIB, thus weakening their common negotiation power.
It is also premature to assess the degree of conditionality and financial standards 
applied by Beijing’s controlled investment bank. In other words, it seems that the 
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main objective of China’s offensive to reshape the global financial order, in particular 
in Asia, by establishing the AIIB as a genuine Asian financial instrument to provide 
regional public goods, is to replace the American leadership by the Chinese leadership. 
By doing that China is defending and thus consolidating conservative behavior in the 
international financial order.
E) China, a middle income country, as an aid donor to its Asian low-income 
neighboring countries
China, as a major emerging economy, but still with a middle income economy status, 
will help its Asian “low-income” neighboring countries, and through this aid it will 
increase therefore not only its political leverage and power ideology but also its trade 
and economic competitivity.
By bringing in its own “economic hinterland” or sphere of influence in Central 
Asia and South East Asia, Beijing will delocalize the uncompetitive industrial sector 
or tasks in the global chain of added value. Building infrastructures and delocalizing 
some mature industrial sectors in low-wages neighbouring countries could certainly 
improve the overall competitiveness and interdependence of Asian regions following 
a center-periphery scheme and reinforcing the Chinese leadership.
However, the viability of this strategy is not shared by other main actors in Asia. 
Firstly, the Chinese political and economic perception of South East Asia as its own 
backyard, supported by a large and influential Chinese Diaspora, could easily increase 
nationalist feelings in some countries as we have seen last years in Vietnam, Myanmar 
and Thailand. Secondly, potential obstacles also include the “acceptance” of this po-
litical and economic Chinese domination by Russia and India and even the European 
Union, very eager to see ASEAN playing an increasing economic and political role in 
South East Asia. From the economic angle, other small but much more innovative and 
technologically developed economies as Taiwan are very interested in increasing their 
presence in the region, showing an attractive development model combining political 
and economic modernity.
On 12 July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration constituted under annex VII 
of the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS) has issued an 
Award of decisive relevance for giving a peaceful legal and cooperative solution to 
the South China Sea conflict (PCA, 2016) (if China decides in the future to embrace 
the international legality) and it could be decisive for the feasibility of this concrete 
OBOR objective.
Actually, the ruling represents a strong defeat to the controversial Chinese claims 
on the South China Sea through the combination of three main decisions. First, the 
Tribunal concludes that China’s claims to historic rights or other sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed 
by the relevant part of the “nine-dash line” are contrary to the Convention and with-
out lawful effect. Second, the Tribunal has also ruled that none of the features in the 
Spratly chain are legally “islands” under Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS (because none 
of them are capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of their own) 
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and accordingly do not generate entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or con-
tinental shelf. Third, none of the Court’s decisions in the Award imply a view with 
respect to questions of land sovereignty because of the Convention does not address 
the sovereignty of States over land territory. However, the Court has found that China’s 
land reclamation and construction of artificial islands, installation, and structures has 
caused severe, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem.
Obviously, China has rejected the ruling asserting that it had “indisputable sov-
ereignty over South China Sea islands, including Scarborough Shoal” and arguing 
that the Permanent Court of Arbitration lacks authority to decide the matter because 
the Philippines’s claims concern issues of sovereignty which are beyond the scope of 
UNCLOS.
Although the Award is binding for the parties, the Convention has not clear mecha-
nisms to ensure its implementation. Therefore, the Award is unlikely to resolve the 
conflict. Nevertheless, this Award could have far-reaching implications for the geopol-
itics in the region and may put at stake the successful implementation of the Chinese 
Silk Maritime Road Initiative; one of the two key branches of OBOR Strategy.
Furthermore, even if China will not comply with the ruling, this Award will estab-
lish a legal benchmarking in the region and create greater legal certainty in the future 
negotiations. It will also reduce the current asymmetry between China and the other 
claimant countries reinforcing the possibility to negotiate a balanced and effective 
Code of Conduct.
If China persists in its aggressive behavior in the region and continue to “buy” the 
political support of the allies for its claims in exchange of financial aid, it will even-
tually undermine both, its international reputation as a responsible partner and, even 
worse, the trust of the international community in the UNCLOS which is one of key 
legal instruments for solving conflicts peacefully.
It is worth mentioning that both big powers, Russia and India, have their own re-
gional geopolitical and trade Initiatives (the Eurasian Economic Union and the Cot-
ton Route respectively), which enhances the skepticism and rivalry towards China’s 
OBOR Initiative.
Most Chinese politicians and scholars used to argue that the idea that the OBOR In-
itiative should be considered as “ the Chinese Marshall Plan” to its Asian low-income 
neighbors countries aimed at creating a new “Common Destiny”4 (Jin Ling, 2015).
In my view, this analogy ignores the historical circumstances, the content and the 
methodology used in the implementation of Europe’s Marshall Plan during the period 
1947–1957. The European economies were devastated by WWII, they lacked com-
pletely in international liquidity (dollars) to import foodstuffs and consumer goods, 
and the credits provided by the USA to buy American goods were reinvested in the 
European economies through the so-called Counterpart Funds. Furthermore, the Plan 
implies the establishment of multilateral organizations such as the Organization of 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payment Union (EPU) to 
facilitate the financing of the intra-European trade. The political aims were to avoid the 
collapse of Western European nations, and prevent them falling into the Communist 
4 Xu Shanda, a noted economist, who first enounced the implementation of the “Chinese Mar-
shall Plan”.
 China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Prospects and Challenges 329
Soviet Union sphere of influence. In the most generous aid program in history, the 
USA made available to foreign countries(Asian countries included) 56 billion dollars 
(36,2 billion to Western European countries) during the period 1945–1957; equivalent 
to one fifth of the USA National Income of 1950 (Cloug, 1970: 523).
None of these features are likely to be present in the Chinese OBOR Initiative. 
It seems much more appropriate to believe that the real intention of this ambitious 
wrongly so-called Chinese Marshall Plan is firstly, to create external demand to find 
“outlets for China’s excess production capacity” (Zhou, Hallding, Han, 2015: 1) and 
secondly, to reduce the economic gap between China and developed countries, thus 
becoming a high-income economy; it also seeks to avoid the risk of falling into the de-
velopment trap, which would see China, after impressive growth for 30 years, unable 
to break through its current middle-income status to become advanced-economy status, 
spending decades “trapped” at a certain per capita income.
The problem of overcapacity shows clearly the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities 
of Chinese “State Capitalism” devaluating the self-proclaimed superiority of “Demo-
cratic Centralism” during the last decade (Yang Guangbin, 2015). Although this model 
of “socialist market economy” à la chinoise was efficient during the last three decades 
of take off in mobilizing inputs and achieving an impressive average economic growth 
rate, it is unclear if the same model without decentralization and de-politicization of the 
enterprises’ key economic decisions could be also efficient in facing a new stage in the 
development path – characterized by a much a more complex economic structure and 
society, alongside growing competition domestically and in international markets.
The still significant degree of State intervention at different governmental levels 
not only prevents the Chinese economy from being granted the Market Economy Sta-
tus (MES), distorting competition at international level, but also impedes the efficient 
allocation of resources giving priority to all Chinese public enterprises at all levels 
of governance (state, provincial and local), and lastly, choosing the technologies and 
niches to pursue. The Chinese leadership is holding back the development of a com-
petitive market economy with its business environment – a competitive sector of small 
and medium side companies much more flexible and open to innovation, high-technol-
ogies and well adapted to the changes of global demand and thus accustomed to taking 
the right decisions following the market signals.5
Most of the potential infrastructure investment projects in the framework of OBOR 
will be done through state-owned enterprises, and as experience shows us that” 80% of 
China’s mining ventures overseas had failed having enjoyed state financial support and 
having had little incentive to carefully assess cost, benefits and risks” (Zhou, Hallding, 
Han, 2015: 4). This explains the objective of Chinese leadership to internationalize 
the OBOR Initiative, sharing with foreign partners the financial risks of investment 
projects.
Could the OBOR Initiative solve the current problems, imbalances and contradic-
tions of the Chinese economic model?
Some scholars such as Francis Fukuyama consider that the Chinese Initiative is 
the right decision for the Chinese growth model and represents a serious challenge for 
5 In the EU 80% of exporting companies, around 600.000, are SMEs.
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America’s hegemony and economic model (with a high deficit of public infrastructure 
capital) and the European Union economy (in need of more public and private invest-
ments to complete the infrastructure networks for the efficient functioning of the en-
ergy, transport and telecommunication internal markets) and “if the OBOR Initiative 
meets the Chinese expectations, the whole of Eurasia, from Indonesia to Poland would 
be transformed in the coming generation” (Fukuyama, 2016: 8).
Along the same line, other scholars such as Erik Berglof (2016) consider that China 
has a very good chance of succeeding in the transition to high-income status with simi-
lar vigor to that the last three decades. In spite of the myriad of short-term challenges 
to address (the Chinese economy is caught in a deflationary spiral, with falling prices 
and increased anxiety over its future prospects reinforcing each other, massive excess 
capacity and mounting bad debt in the state-owned corporate sector) China has an 
impressive capacity to transform.
Others are more skeptical and suggest that the new Chinese Keynesianism will not 
be enough to solve its new structural problems and that the OBOR Initiative risks ex-
acerbating China’s economic imbalances (Yanfei Li, 2016).
In my view the Chinese development model is at a crossroads. The model has 
reached the mature stage in the lifecycle of most of its basic and manufacturing sec-
tors. With an ageing population and rising salaries, the country needs to boost its pro-
ductivity by improving technological content and capacity to innovate. It would allow 
to change the current profile of industrial and services model in order to advance in the 
Global value chain. This change requires a radical improvement in the allocation of 
resources, giving a decisive role to the market and reducing significantly State inter-
vention in the economy. Otherwise, the phantom of the development trap could haunt 
the Chinese economy for decades, with or without the OBOR Initiative such as defined 
today. It goes without say that a successful outcome of this Strategy has the potential 
to dispel the specter.
F) The creation of an Asian Financial Market with the Renminbi as its reference 
currency in order to internationalize the Chinese economy and spread the risks 
of their investments
The achievement of a genuine “Renminbi financial and monetary area” is one of the 
most ambitious objectives of OBOR Initiative. The new Chinese leadership entertains 
the idea of establishing a de facto Asian monetary zone and upgrading thus the status 
of the Renminbi as one of the three international currencies as the Dollar and the Euro. 
Having their own currency as the key Asian currency is a symbol of power that Japan 
has never been able to make a reality with the yen.
The recent inclusion of Renminbi (RMB) in the IMF’s (2016) Special Drawing 
Right Basket (with a higher weight than the yen), the launching of OBOR and its main 
financial instrument (AIIB), the BRICS New Development Bank, the substantial par-
ticipation in the multilateral foreign exchange reserves pool known as the Chiang Mai 
Initiative are all steps contributing to the internationalization process of the Chinese 
currency.
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This aims implicitly formulated in the OBOR main document (National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, 2015) suggests other 
“governments of the countries along the Belt and Road and their companies and finan-
cial institutions with good credit-rating to issue renminbi bonds in China” and “quali-
fied Chinese financial institutions and companies are encouraged to issue bonds in 
renminbi and foreign currencies outside China, and use the funds thus collected in 
countries along the Belt and Road” (Vision and Actions, 2015: 8).
Bilateral and multilateral financial cooperation between the participating countries, 
as well as market integration, are not only important for implementing the OBOR Ini-
tiative but above all are ways to share and spread the risks of the investments.
The Chinese endeavor had its first success in October 2014. The UK was indeed 
the first Western economy to issue a sovereign RMB bond outside China in the Lon-
don financial market outlining the RMB’s potential as a future reserve currency (UK 
Government, 2014).
* * *
China is not prepared to give up its aspiration to be the dominant power in Asia at any 
cost; even though it could further damage its international image which is currently 
far from being a credible, predictable and responsible partner respecting international 
norms. Their decisions are always influenced by internal advantages ensuring political 
stability which for the Chinese Communist Party is of paramount importance.
Aggressive China policy – or rather “assertive” as American academia prefers to 
use –forms part of its long term geopolitical strategy. This explains for instance Chi-
nese behavior in the South China Sea conflict. In this line, the final objective of Chi-
nese authorities in launching the OBOR Strategy is to see China become in two or 
three decades the first world economic superpower.
The recent Award of the Permanent Arbitration Court on the South China Sea con-
flict could be decisive for the feasibility of the Silk Road Maritime dimension of the 
OBOR Initiative. The South China Sea conflict on Spratlys, Paracel and Scarborough 
Islands sovereignty is a test case for the international credibility of China. If the conflict 
escalates and China pursues its harsh and arrogant policy, it will eventually undermine 
both, its international reputation as a responsible partner and, even worse, the trust of 
the international community in the UNCLOS which is one of key legal instruments for 
solving conflicts peacefully.
Russia and India represent, in Chinese perception, the real threats to its national 
interest and security. Therefore, China sees them with great suspicion while the Euro-
pean Union is the perfect partner is an important alien being far away, a strong trade 
and technological partner and a rather weak global actor.
Pragmatism with a great deal of hypocrisy and not moralist behavior as some 
American scholars define Chinese foreign policy (principle of non-intervention in in-
ternal affairs, e.g. in Syria civil war) is an essential part of China’s diplomacy which 
has proved to be very efficient worldwide.
The OBOR main document (vision and action) privileges bilateral to multilateral 
negotiations, and consultations with the potential countries concerned by the Initiative 
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are being established between governments without any opening to public consulta-
tions as the EU does.
Communist Chinese economic success is not limited by most of the key interna-
tional rules regarding environment, social protection, respect of intellectual property 
rights or transparent public markets. Regardless of official statements, China is likely 
to pursue its trade and geopolitical objectives without caring for multilateral inter-
national rules. The international community should be well aware of the permanent 
and alarming lack of transparency in the economic activities of Chinese firms – in the 
context of current and future negotiations. If this behavior is not countered, we may 
witness the disappearance of some economic sectors such as for example Egyptian 
textiles or the European solar panel industry.
China’s way to the Market Economic Status shows the limits and contradictions 
of the Chinese oxymoron model of a “socialist market economy” at world level. The 
importance of the current overcapacity in the most of basic industrial sectors highlights 
both the programming errors made by the past Chinese leadership but also their nega-
tive impact on world markets and the economy and social stability of third states.
Regarding ASEAN countries, China does not have much to fear from them as they 
are relatively weak militarily and dependent on Chinese economic and trade influence. 
The only country which has some potential power to confront Chinese politics is Indone-
sia, also because of its preferential ties with Japan which gives it some more strength.
The European Union has underestimated the geopolitical and economic conse-
quences of the Chinese OBOR Initiative on its neighboring regions (in particular in the 
Balkans and Eastern partnership regions).This initiative could also jeopardize the eco-
nomic and political cohesion of the EU. The European Union and its Member States 
have not yet adopted a common position on this ambitious and ambiguous Chinese 
project. China has exploited the current weaknesses of EU cohesion to launch an inten-
sive diplomatic campaign at bilateral level, the so-called “16+1 format” which could 
jeopardize the internal cohesion between Member States and the necessary coordina-
tion with EU Institutions in preserving the unicity of the EU transport and infrastruc-
ture network policies.
When implementing the OBOR Initiative, China should change its current behav-
ior in terms of cooperation and integration processes and could learn from the meth-
odology and modus operandi of the European Union cooperation and neighborhood 
policies. Consultation and true partnership with third less developed and less powerful 
countries should replace the top-down approach and imposing decisions.
The OBOR Initiative has a complex trade dimension. It is the alternative and com-
petitive to mega-trade deals China wants to implement to counter the TPP Agreement. 
One relevant question in this context is how to ensure coherence and compatibility 
between the TTP Agreement and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership) – the Free trade agreement in negotiation between the ten member States 
of ASEAN and the six States with which ASEAN has existing free trade agreements 
(Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand) and due to be con-
cluded at the end of 2016.
Another relevant and complex question is how to harmonize the future RCEP 
Agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union in the framework of the 
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implementation of the OBOR Initiative to Central Asian partner countries. Finally, one 
question of paramount significance for the world trade common rules system remains 
to be seen: will it be possible to multilateralise the achievements of these big regional 
Mega trade deals.
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ABSTRACT
The launching of “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) Initiative by president Xi Jinpin is an essen-
tial instrument of the Strategy aiming to maintain the internal control and political stability and 
dynamises an ailing Chinese economy. The concept of OBOR is ambitious but ambiguous, per-
fectly in line with traditional Chinese pattern: “Hide our capabilities and bide our time.” In this 
context, a question is posed: Is China ready to abide by international law and be a reliable politi-
cal and trade partner? The author analyzes the prospects and challenges of the Chinese Strategy 
and try to identify what are the real objectives of this project which may bring potential benefits 
but also important risks for its Asian neighbors and the international community at large.
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CHIŃSKA INICJATYWA JEDNEGO PASA I JEDNEJ DROGI 
– WYZWANIA I PERSPEKTYWY 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Inicjatywa „Jeden pas i jedna droga” (One Belt One Road – OBOR) Prezydenta Xi Jinpin 
jest istotnym instrumentem strategii mającej na celu utrzymanie kontroli wewnętrznej i stabil-
ności politycznej oraz zdynamizować schorzałą chińską gospodarkę. Koncepcja OBOR jest 
ambitna, ale niejednoznaczna, zgodna z tradycyjną chińską zasadą “Ukryj nasze możliwości 
i daj nam czas”. W tym kontekście pojawia się pytanie czy ChRL jest gotowa na przestrze-
ganie prawa międzynarodowego i na bycie przewidywalnym i odpowiedzialnym partnerem 
politycznym i handlowym? Autor analizuje perspektywy i wyzwania chińskiej strategii i stara 
się dociec jakie są rzeczywiste cele tego projektu, który może przynieść potencjalne korzyści, 
ale także stanowić poważne zagrożenie dla jej azjatyckich sąsiadów i całej społeczności mię-
dzynarodowej.
 
Słowa kluczowe: inicjatywa „Jeden pas i jedna droga”, Morski Szlak Jedwabny, Azjatycki 
Bank Inwestycji Infrastrukturalnych, Euroazjatycka Wspólnota Gospodarcza, Partnerstwo 
Transpacyficzne, Regionalne Kompleksowe Partnerstwo Gospodarcze, Mega bloki handlowe, 
relacje Unia Europejska-Chiny, chiński plan Marshalla
